>>225878you're lifting quotes from the transcendental aesthetic without attribution and modifying the wording slightly to adapt it to my post and in so doing making it seem like it's contradicting it when the original (and sometimes also your modifications of it) are in perfect agreement with it.
>Time is not an empirical concept that is drawn from the experience of change.the "change" i'm talking about in that post is not something one can have an experience of, but is a "feature" (or "form" in kantian) of experience itself. change is not something you can touch, see, hear, etc., but is a feature that is always present in experience, the the changing itself of sensations (tactile, visual, auditory, etc). therefore, it's not an empirical concept, since there are no empirical objects from which to abstract it from. the way i "derived" it in the post when i said, "look for time in our perception", wasn't by "drawing it from an experience" - because all experience necessarily has it - but by what kant called "the faculty for intuiting a priori".
the original sentence by kant (A30/B46) in guyer-wood's translation is, "Time is not an empirical concept that is drawn from an experience", which is fully in line with how i treated it.
>Simultaneity or succession, that are the basis for change, would not come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them a priori.this is the next sentence in the transcendental aesthetic. the only modification you did is adding ", that are the basis for change," to adapt it to my post, which ironically makes it literally equivalent to what i said in it, yet you somehow say it as if it were asserting something new that contradicted what i said. simultaneity is what i enumerated as (1) and succession is what i enumerated as (2), and i said that these two are what time in essence is, and furthermore that they "are fundamental and necessary facts of experience".
>From that a priori intuition we can ground further apodictic principles about the relation of timebut i also said the same thing informally in a passing comment and you're just repeating it to me in kantonese
>and that is in essence what time is (then we can derive further facts about it from those two if we want to … ).did you even read what you replied to?
>Because this inner sense [time] has no shape we can make analogy and represent the temporal sequence as an infinite line and infer from the properties of the line to the properties of time, with the sole difference that the parts of the line are simultaneous but those of time are successive.the original is in A33/B50, you only changed the wording slightly and took out a passing remark that was irrelevant to our discussion. but this is still basically what i said, except for kant saying that there's only a "sole difference", whereas i brought up a second one, that simultaneity in space is necessarily plural, whereas in time it's necessarily singular.
>has no shapethat's literally the point of my first post. there you go, it has no shape, he himself said it, so it makes no sense to speak of it as linear, circular, or orthogonal (philip k. dick).
>we can make analogy and represent the temporal sequence as an infinite line [original in guyer-wood's: "we also attempt to remedy this lack [of shape] through analogies, and represent the temporal sequence through a line progressing to infinity"]i said, "we only create such a model of it in thought … imagining the moments of experience of our lives as being placed on a line"
>with the sole difference that the parts of the line are simultaneous but those of time are successive.i said, "in that model, we're imagining them each as frozen moments, which contradicts (2), and in that circle or line all of them are "happening all at once", which contradicts (1) [singularity of simultaneity]." but now i realize better that "frozen moments" and "happening all at once" are really the same thing put differently.
now, the key to this whole discussion is ultimately that you're misinterpreting what kant meant by making an analogy. he doesn't mean that time is actually an infinite line (which was explicitly claimed in the ouroboros post) just because we can make an analogy of it. he explicitly denies that in what you quoted and points out that there's an essential difference between the two. if by making an analogy of time as a line you can elucidate its properties it's because both time and space are "quanta continua" (A169/B211), as he says it in the doctrine of elements, and the properties he has in mind in the context of the transcendental aesthetic are precisely the properties of continuity. but that is also the case irrespective of whether you choose to imagine it as any other shape (schopenhauer uses the spatial analogies of a sphere and a circle), because those shapes, being space, are also continuous. your mistake was that you took kant to literally mean that time did have a shape - an infinite line - when he explicitly said it didn't have any, and merely thought that another shape - a circle - made more sense to you based on a probability argument that is also hella unkantian. so, to put it in kantian, you mixed up one form of sensibility with the other and then derived a metaphysical conclusion from that which went beyond the bounds of possible experience.